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This dissertation aims at verifying the effectiveness of a debt mutualization mechanism 
(Eurobond) to immunize the European Monetary Union from exogenous shocks. 
The first section presents the flaws of the EMU project that became clear with the surge of the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2009, when the interventions of the European institutions proved to be 
insufficient. After a literature review of all kind of Eurobonds proposed in the last twenty 
years, the need for a mechanism designed to tackle the tradeoff between debt stabilization and 
the necessity to minimize the scope for moral hazard emerges. 
 In order to address this duplicity, we propose a bi-faced Eurobond (named Janus) that trades 
on the markets at a unique interest rate and charges differentiated financing costs based on 
fiscal fundamentals of Member states. 
The second section deals with the determinants of government bond yields presenting the 
time-varying role of each component of risk: global aggregate risk, risk aversion, liquidity 
risk, country-specific risk (including a focus on different measures of credit risk) and 
contagion risk. This overview gives theoretical and empirical foundation to the design of the 
Janus Eurobond. 
The third section sets up a model for debt dynamics; using quarterly data in a Vector Auto 
Regressive model we study the interaction in the macroeconomic system for the time lapse 
(2000Q1 – 2019Q2) between five variables: interest expenditure, growth, inflation, primary 
balance and nominal interest rate. The VAR output lets us forecast future values for the 
endogenous variables. Subsequently we use an equation describing debt evolution to find the 
implicit forecast of debt dynamics for three countries: Italy, France and Germany, 
representing respectively a peripheral, an intermediate and a core country of the EMU. The 
analysis is repeated introducing the Janus Eurobond scenario. The comparison between 
median forecasted values in the two scenarios finds an important benefit for Italy in the latter 
one and no significant difference for France and Germany. The forecasted variability is 
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always lower in the Janus Eurobond scenario. Afterwards, the model is extended considering 
the primary budget position adjusted for cycle; debt dynamics seems quite robust to this 
extension. The following paragraph presents a focus on interest expenditure, aiming at 
understanding the debt dynamics in the different scenarios. 
The last section verifies whether the Janus Eurobond could immunize debt dynamics from 
exogenous monetary, real and fiscal shocks. A rise in inflation, a growth slowdown and an 
increased expansive fiscal policy are considered in the baseline and Janus Eurobond scenario. 
Results support the suitability of the Janus Eurobond as an immunizing instrument for the 
European Monetary Union.  
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1. The stability problem of the European 
Monetary Union 
The surge of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 pointed out the weaknesses of the 
monetary union. It had been clear since the beginning of the project that the elimination of 
monetary policy and foreign exchange policy at national level would represent an important 
challenge when dealing with negative macroeconomic and financial shocks (Feldstein 1997 
and Wyplosz 1997). According to Lane (2012), the institutional design of the euro increased 
fiscal risk in the pre-crisis period and amplified fiscal dynamics once the crisis occurred. 
During the first phase of the monetary union, spreads on government bonds between different 
European countries were almost null: less virtuous nations benefitted of the positive 
externality that being part of the monetary union represented. When macroeconomic and 
financial conditions changed a few years later, markets’ judgments became stricter than 
before 2007 crisis1 (Caggiano and Greco 2012). 
After the 2007 financial crisis boomed, the European banking system suffered: banks’ balance 
sheets teemed with rotted securities on the asset side. Consequently, the European 
governments increased expenditure in order to support the banking system and boost real 
economy. This contributed to exacerbate fiscal disorders. Between 2009 and 2010, some 
countries faced difficulties financing themselves on the markets. Financial markets started 
worrying about fiscal imbalances, and they required compensation for the increased default 
risk. In fact, the spreads of government yields between disciplined and undisciplined countries 
increased. 
The surge in interest expenditure contributed to deteriorating the fiscal position of countries, 
which were already suffering, leading to a proper sovereign debt crisis. 
                                                
1 See Section 2.3 The determinants of government bond yields, Country-specific risk 
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The crisis was such that all the euro system was in danger; if one country defaulted, it was not 
clear if the euro system could survive the shock. Moreover, the failure of the monetary union 
could represent the failure of the whole project of integration between member states; the 
problem could spread from the economic to the political plan.2  
Crisis conditions highlighted the fragility of the monetary union, in absence of a banking 
union and other European-level buffer mechanisms (Lane, 2012). Unfortunately, European 
regulation was not clear about the procedures to adopt, however an intervention seemed 
necessary. 
 
1.1 The EFSF and ESM programmes 
In 2010, Greece lost the capability to finance itself on the markets. Despite general efforts to 
ensure stability during the previous years, no institutional solution existed. The immediate 
reaction was the Greek Loan Facility: euro area members granted a loan to the Greek citizens 
on a bilateral basis. 
 In June 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a public limited liability 
company under Luxembourg law, was born as a temporary solution. Its main function was to 
signal European commitment to the integrity of the monetary union. Member states 
established a Framework Agreement to govern EFSF and its €440 billion guarantee structure. 
One of EFSF’s main tasks was to keep credit rating the highest possible; therefore its lending 
capacity was back-guaranteed by highly rated entities. In June 2011, its maximum guarantee 
commitment reached €780 billion by decision of euro zone Heads of State and Government. 
In addition to this, the new agreement increased the number of available instruments to the 
EFSF, expanding its operational flexibility. The palette of instruments included loan facilities, 
                                                
2 “If the euro fails, Europe fails.” The German Chancellor Angela Merkel made clear her point in September 7th, 
2011 speech. At the time member states feared that country specific difficulties to access financial markets could 
make the whole euro system collapse. 
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which provided recapitalisation to financial institutions through loans to governments, market 
facilities, purchase of government bonds on primary and secondary market, and precautionary 
facilities. The precautionary credit line, which included both a Precautionary Conditioned 
Credit Line (PCCL) and an Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL), demanded specific but 
lighter requirements and active monitoring. They consisted in a loan or primary market 
purchase and initially lasted for one year, renewable twice for six month each time. The EFSF 
financial assistance relied on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the involved 
country.  
In practice, the most commonly implemented has been the loan facility. In order to receive all 
kind of financial support, countries had to meet eligibility criteria. They regarded the 
sustainability of public debt and commitment to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP). Moreover, other criteria regarded capital markets access, 
external position and banking system stability. 
In October 2012, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) followed, as a permanent 
solution, the EFSF, which still exists as a legal entity but no longer active. Countries that face 
difficulties accessing financial markets can ask to enter the program and, if eligible, borrow 
financial resources. The ESM, as the EFSF, works on a cash-for-reform-basis, a structural and 
financial reforming plan is required when signing a deal with the ESM. The palette of 
instruments at its disposal is the same as the one described for the EFSF. So far, EFSF and 
ESM have disbursed €254.5 billion to five countries: Ireland (February 2011), Portugal (June 
2011), Greece (March 2012, August 2015), Spain (December 2012) and Cyprus (May 2013); 
easing the debt burden, given lower interest rates and larger repayment periods. Cyprus, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain successfully exited the program without a follow-up arrangement. 
Greece instead is the only still active program.  
Both these mechanisms served their mandates: helping in crisis resolution and rebuilding 
confidence and financial stability in the euro area (ESM, 2017). Both of them acted in a 
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professional and neutral manner, achieving credibility in the eyes of market agents. In fact, 
the programmes’ activities satisfied both creditors and borrowers. 
 However ESM and EFSF functioning present some limits. First, the delay of the intervention 
in some cases increased the financing needs to regain debt sustainability. These solutions 
were set up in crisis conditions, when countries that could no longer finance themselves on 
the markets requested an intervention. The burden of the administrative system, the definition 
of eligibility criteria and related assessment, unavoidably delayed the rescue. Secondly, 
monitoring activity on structural reforms implementation usually require longer time horizons 
and larger administrative capacity to be effective. 
Although these programs have undoubtedly been necessary and somehow successful, it is 
clear that these measures alone were not sufficient to support the monetary union under 
financial and macroeconomic instability.  
 
 1.2 European Central Bank’s intervention 
The European Central Bank had been injecting liquidity to support the European banking 
system since the 2007 financial crisis. This action became insufficient when some countries 
lost market access to finance themselves. ECB intervention included both conventional and 
unconventional actions. It mainly focused on interest-rate reduction, enhanced credit support, 
securities purchase on the secondary market. In May 2010, the 209 billion euros Securities 
Market Programme (SMP) initiated. The euro area central banks were empowered to purchase 
marketable debt instruments denominated in euro. They were allowed to act on the secondary 
markets for securities issued by the central governments or public entities of the Member 
States; both on primary and secondary market when the issuer was a private entity 
incorporated in the euro area (Governing Council of the European Central Bank, 2010). 
Officially, the programme tried to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and 
restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism (ECB Press Office, 2010). In 
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practice, it was an attempt to help governments whose sovereign securities traded at 
unsustainable interest rates on financial markets (Lionello, 2015). 
After the setting up of the European Stability Mechanism, the ECB initiated a more structured 
asset purchasing policy on the secondary market. The former ECB president, Mario Draghi, in 
his speech at the Global Investment Conference in London, July 2012, stated the 
irreversibility of the single currency and his engagement to preserve it3. This announcement 
demonstrated the determination of the ECB to keep euro area integer (Clayes, 2014). 
In September 2012, the ECB set up a new program, the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT), which are outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets. It assured 
unlimited monetary support conditional to the implementation of reforms of macroeconomic 
adjustment under ESM supervision. A necessary condition for the programme to be active is 
the attachment to an EFSF/ESM programme. Transactions had to focus on the shorter part of 
the yield curve, purchasing sovereign bonds with maturity from one to three years. OMT had 
no ex-ante size limit, but the ECB guaranteed its commitment to a certain degree of 
transparency, with the weekly publication of holdings and related market value. As the SMP, 
the OMT required full sterilisation of the liquidity injected in the market. 
Even if it was never active nor effective during its first year of existence, the OMT 
programme announcement had positive effects: the commitment of the ECB to the single 
currency stabilization helped contain speculation on financial markets. Market agents thought 
this announcement was credible, because pressure on the euro decreased. The announcement 
of such commitment convinced market agents; ECB’s move was a success in this perspective. 
OMT stopped speculation against euro but was not effective in adverting the risk of deflation, 
therefore on January 22nd , 2015, the ECB pursued Quantitative Easing. The Governing 
                                                
3 The ECB president Mario Draghi made a clear point in 2012 August 2nd press conference when he made the 
statement: “It is pointless to bet against the euro. It is pointless to go short on the euro. [...] It is pointless because 
the euro will stay and it is irreversible.” Market agents thought this announcement was credible, because 
pressure on the euro decreased. The announcement was a success. 
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Council of the ECB announced an expanded asset purchase programme, aimed at fulfilling its 
mandate of price stability. It added the purchase of sovereign bonds to the existing private 
sector asset purchase programmes in order to face the risk of deflation that was threatening 
the euro area. The ECB Quantitative Easing injected liquidity in the financial system 
purchasing bonds for 60 billion euros until September 2016. According to the ECB press 
release of the time, the central bank had to pursue its objectives in “an unprecedented 
economic and financial environment” and claimed that its decisions were in full compliance 
with the EU Treaties. 
These actions altogether seemed to bear out a new interpretation of the ECB mandate, namely 
monetary policy and price stability. 
 
1.3 The Gauweiler case 
The ECB’s behaviour has been criticised and the legality of its action questioned. The main 
objection has been that ECB’s actions aimed at supporting the public finances of some 
member states, while it should pursue only monetary policy objectives according to a strict 
interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and ensuing legislation. The debate did not only stick 
to the academic field. In January 2014 the German Constitutional Court, prompted by a group 
of German citizens (Gauweiler and others), raised a preliminary question before the European 
Court of Justice. The case was made of two fundamental questions. First, whether the OMT 
programme could qualify as a monetary or economic policy measure, conflicting with the 
ECB mandate in the latter case. Second, whether this programme infringed Art. 123 TFEU 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) which prevents the ECB from providing 
monetary financing to member states (Lionello, 2015).  
According to the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the EU, the real objective of 
ECB actions was monetary policy, protecting its main transmission mechanism in order to 
maintain price stability. It was therefore necessary to do actions in order to keep the monetary 
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union safe, otherwise, if the monetary system collapsed, there would not be any scope for 
price stability and regular ECB objectives. In this perspective, safeguarding the single 
currency and the stability of the system are ancillary objectives to the ones for which the ECB 
has explicit mandate. 
Moreover, in the Advocate General’s view, in case of implementation of OMT the ECB 
should distance itself from the economic policy and fiscal requirements of the ESM, which 
clearly fall under the definition of economic and fiscal policy. Finally, the ECB should 
introduce detailed regulation for the OMT programme not to infringe the principle of 
proportionality. 
Secondly, it seems clear to the AG that an asset purchase programme on the secondary 
market, when prices already stabilized, is not conflicting with the non-financing member 
states restriction. In this perspective, ECB actions do not necessarily alter fiscal discipline. 
The ECB eventually won the case: the interdependence between monetary policy and 
economic objectives made it clear that the monetary policy instruments used by the ECB had 
unavoidable economic consequences (Tridimas, 2016). 
Nevertheless, this case highlighted the unsustainable asymmetry between economic union and 
monetary union. Moreover, it became clear that some factors contributed to the eruption of 
sovereign debt crisis; the economic union fragmentation, the lack of common debt guarantees 
or effective coordination of budgetary policies. Under financial adverse conditions and 
institutional weakness the survival of the single currency itself is in danger, consequently all 
efforts towards price stability would be ineffective. For this reason, the ECB intervened to 
reduce financial instability, transforming its role, acting as a guarantor of stability of the 
monetary union as a whole. Provisionally the ECB has taken charge of the role of conditional 
lender of last resort for the euro zone banking system and sovereign debt market. It is in this 
framework that some permanent solutions seem essential in order to improve financial 
stability of the monetary union and prevent future crisis. 
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1.4 A structural remedy: the Eurobond 
Considering the narrative of the euro zone crisis briefly described above, it seems clear that 
the absence of fiscal union or at least an effective fiscal coordination is a problem for the 
monetary union. The level of debt in euro zone countries is nothing exceptional compared to 
other economies across the world (Boonstra, 2011); the weakness of the EMU comes from the 
fact that monetary policy is constrained, therefore it is an inadequate instrument to relieve 
debt burden. If we reverse the point of view, the BCE does not have explicit mandate to buy 
Euro Zone sovereign debt instruments. The European Monetary Union needs a neutral 
corrective instrument to heal its structural weakness, a European safe asset. This instrument 
may satisfy the need for a monetary policy tool, in order to perform open market operations 
and protect financial stability of the EMU keeping member countries’ debt levels on a 
sustainable path. Moreover, some economists theorized that this safe asset could become an 
alternative to US Treasury Bonds on the international markets, empowering the euro as 
reserve currency (Claessens et al., 2012). 
The Giovannini Group (2000) was the first to advance the Eurobond proposal, as a strong 
instrument of debt management cooperation, increasing market integration and liquidity. A 
Eurobond is a security emitted by an institution on behalf of the monetary union. Part of the 
debt burden countries are currently bearing would be relieved, theoretically increasing the 
protection from flight to safety and volatile market sentiments. The pooling of risks should 
ideally enhance risk-sharing, giving investors the opportunity to buy an almost-safe asset. The 
current fragmentation of the European bond market gives rise to frictions and inefficiencies. 
A unique bond market could provide protection against cooling episodes on the markets and 
liquidity crisis. Furthermore, a European bond would be a completely neutral monetary policy 
transmission tool at disposal of the ECB. Currently when the ECB needs to conduct open 
market operations, it can only buy or sell country-specific bonds and has to intervene in more 
markets in order to observe some impartiality constraints, often compelling it to operate 
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inefficiently. Nevertheless, the Eurobond project never came to light. It has been strongly 
criticized by many authors (Issing 2009 and Ifo Institute 2011). Firstly because its realization 
presents considerable political barriers. The unique interest rate would give the chance to 
fiscally undisciplined countries to finance themselves cheaply. The scope for moral hazard 
would be high; the risk of creating bad incentives is worth consideration. The Eurobond 
subscription may imply “joint and/or several” guarantees burdening on involved states: if a 
member country defaults, the others have to pay to satisfy creditors. Germany and other 
northern countries strongly opposed to the Eurobond fearing it implied additional financing 
costs and risk for their country, while the countries in fiscal troubles would benefit from it. In 
other words, they thought fiscally virtuous countries would subsidize undisciplined ones. In 
any case, the political implementation of such mechanism seemed difficult. Gros (2011) 
highlighted Europe’s lack of fiscal integration; he claimed that the Eurobond would make 
sense only if the United States of Europe existed. 
The design of the debt mutualization mechanism crucially influences the feasibility and 
success of the project. 
During the last twenty years, many Eurobond proposals tried to deal with the limits presented. 
De Grauwe and Mosen (2009) proposed a collective debt instrument that may contain moral 
hazard. They designed a world in which the European Investment Bank, whose shareholders 
are member countries of the European Union, manages the emission of Eurobonds. These 
securities trade at a unique interest rate on the market, calculated as the weighted average of 
interest rates on member states’ bonds. Shareholders transfer part of their public debt to the 
EIB, receiving financial resources on which they pay a differentiated spread according to their 
fiscal position and behaviour, the same they would pay on the financial markets. This design 
protects member countries from shifts in market sentiments and contagion effects in case of 
liquidity crisis, preserving correct incentives to fiscal discipline. 
This approach was criticized arguing that if the spreads payed to receive financial resources 
were the same as on the markets, interest expenditure for many countries would remain 
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unsustainable, therefore the stability issued would not be settled (Boonstra, 2011). 
A different proposal is the “Blue Bond-Red Bond” mutualization scheme (Delpla and von 
Weizsäcker, 2010). It is a voluntary program and it consists in splitting a nation’s debt into 
two tranches: a senior tranche up to 60% of the total stock, emitted in Blue bonds, which are 
safe and guaranteed at European level; the remaining part has only a national guarantee, thus 
Red Bonds, as they are riskier. This scheme should let the markets differentiate the cost of 
borrowing of individual States, avoiding the convergence to a unique interest rate, which is 
something the most disciplined countries cannot accept. According to the authors, this 
mechanism should provide isolation from the risk of contagion from countries facing 
difficulties in refinancing on the markets. Theoretically, market discipline applied to the 
residual stock of debt should keep incentives unaltered and moral hazard under control. 
Unfortunately, the reliance on market discipline was one of the main downsides of this 
proposal; Boonstra (2011) points out that markets completely mispriced national bonds in the 
decade 2000-2010, just to make an example. Moreover, since participation is voluntary, the 
most stable countries may not join the program and, if one country decided to exit it, the 
whole system would suffer. Boonstra (2012) advanced the proposal of the transitional regime 
of Euro-Treasury Bills: collectively guaranteed (cross-guarantee) short-term Eurobonds. The 
participation to the program is subject to solvency condition: those countries that already need 
financial support do not qualify. Insolvent countries can pursue their reorder path as agreed 
with the EFSF/ESM. Once stabilized their finances, they might apply to join the program. 
Participating countries can finance themselves over a period of four years through collectively 
guaranteed short-term (maximum maturity is two years) bonds issued by a new agency, the 
EMU Fund. States cannot issue other short-term bonds, while they manage issuance of long-
term securities singularly. 
Financing costs may vary from country to country: States whose budget deficit exceeds 3% 
and/or with a national debt/GDP ratio exceeding 60% will have to pay a premium on top of 
the necessary costs to finance the agency. The premium is a weighted average of the 
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deviations to target debt and deficit levels. The relative size of each component would be the 
result of a political bargaining process. Part of the resources collected through this process 
become as reserves in the EMU Fund balance sheet. This element together with the strict 
criteria that constrain participation and the cross-guarantees ensure that Euro-T Bills will 
reassure the markets. The author envisages also a liquidity premium given the dimension of 
the market and low-interest rates. 
The temporary nature of the program is an advantage firstly because it is fast to introduce, 
secondly because it gives the opportunity to experience a “trial period”. It gives member 
states the time and opportunity to design carefully a permanent solution. Its structure 
encourages states to design long-term oriented policies and reorder their finances. Moreover, 
it has a very strong disciplinary effect: the moral hazard issue is contained differentiating 
financing costs through the mechanism mentioned above. In addition to this, its sanctions are 
credible because if states do not respect the requirements they shut out of the programme or 
the follow-up.  
However, the exclusion of an undisciplined member state would imply non-negligible effects 
on the stability of the mechanism. Another limit of the mechanism is that weaker participating 
countries may not be able to issue long-term maturity bonds; financing debt only to short-term 
securities may increase the sensitivity to interest rate. Finally, the political decision process 
assigning relative weights of debt and deficit deviations to targets may encounter some 
frictions. 
De Haan et al. (2013) present a scheme in which the European budget authority is in charge of 
emitting bonds on the markets on behalf of euro zone countries. Member countries qualify 
only if they prove to keep their fiscal position on a sustainable path as defined in the 
Maastricht Treaty or according to monitored adjustment programs followed by the ESM. 
This proposal has criticized because it would require a deep degree of fiscal integration 
between state members, therefore the times do not seem mature for this kind of solution, 
which would need a long process to restructure the EMU and create a proper fiscal union. 
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Going beyond the need of additional fiscal integration between member states, Brunnermeir 
et al. (2012) present the European Safe Bond system. The European Debt Agency is the 
institution in charge for the purchase of national bonds according to some size-related fixed 
weights and the emission of two kinds of securities: the ESBies (senior tranche) and a junior 
one. The main advantage is that there is no need to overturn the structure of the EMU 
designed by the Treaties. 
During this decade many other proposals have been advanced; each and every one of them is 
an attempt to provide Euro Zone countries with a mechanism that increase liquidity in 
government bond markets, thus decreasing financing costs and keeping debt levels on a 
sustainable path, while containing moral hazard and dealing with imperfect fiscal integration 
of the union. It is clear from the analysis above, that this challenge presents some trade-offs. 
The EMU did not implement any of these proposals. It is not clear whether this happened for 
political reasons rather than for economic ones. Nonetheless, each proposal mentioned 
presented some limits. 
 
1.5 A bi-faced Eurobond proposal 
The previous analysis of Eurobond versions highlighted an intrinsic trade-off: the necessity to 
reduce the debt and interest expenditure burden for European countries against the need to 
contain moral hazard. Redistribution is unacceptable for most virtuous countries, which are 
not willing to subsidize others. Therefore, it seems necessary to design a mechanism that 
could reproduce market incentives and, at the same time, support countries that face 
difficulties in refinancing themselves for the sake of European Monetary Union’s stability. 
In order to tackle the trade-off we imagined a model for a European mechanism whose design 
is twofold. Our idea exploits the intuitions De Grawe and Mosen (2009) and Boonstra (2012). 
The first ones proposed a Eurobond carrying a unique financial interest on the markets and a 
mechanism to replicate the same financing costs that every member country would pay on its 
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specific bond market, keeping market incentives theoretically unaltered. On the pros side, 
creating unique market for Eurobond could provide the European Central Bank with a 
completely neutral instrument to perform open market operations, without passing through the 
single-country central banks and government bond markets. The limit is that, as highlighted 
before, for some States, interest expenditure would be unsustainable. The second one 
proposes a mechanism to apply differentiated financing costs on a fiscal incentives basis: i.e. 
countries deviating from a target level of debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP pay more to 
finance themselves through the Eurobond. 
Our Eurobond proposal combines these two features: a unique interest-bearing Eurobond and 
a discipline mechanism based on fiscal ratios.  
Every member country could decide to allocate part of its debt to a European Debt Fund, who 
is in charge of the emission of Eurobond on the markets. The same institution would 
supervise fiscal behavior of member States and charge differentiated financing costs. 
We decided to name this Eurobond Janus. The name comes from Latin mythology, Janus was 
the God of Beginnings; he was capable of looking both at the past and the future at the same 
time. In fact, in every representation he had with two faces. Similarly, the Janus Eurobond, is 
characterized by duplicity traits, which lie in the construction of the interest-rate. Janus 
Eurobond should trade at a unique interest rate on a new, large market for European 
government bonds; this is the “basis interest”. Furthermore, each country will pay an 
additional differentiated spread, according to specific parameters based on fiscal 
fundamentals. The differentiated financing costs should reduce the scope for moral hazard 
and safeguard the right incentives. Member countries would be encouraged to keep their fiscal 
balances on a sustainable path.  
Before moving to an empirical simulation of the Eurobond we imagined, we look at risk 
determinants of government bond yields. Our intent is to create a system in which 
institutional discipline replaces market discipline. Market discipline has the flaw that it can 
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expose the whole EMU to financial instability4. The main objective of the Janus Eurobond 
proposal is to create an instrument that protects and stabilizes the Eurozone and at the same 
time keeps the correct incentives for member countries. This is the reason why next section 
has a focus on markets, how do they price risk and their implicit discipline. 
                                                
4 The problem of instability of the European Monetary Union lies in the fact that it is highly exposed to market 
sentiment and erratic movements; moreover its current structure is characterised high degree of contagion risk. 
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2. The determinants of government bond yields 
In this section, we focus on the main drivers that explain spreads, the differences between 
government bonds yields in order to be able to build a model, aimed at keeping moral hazard 
under control, charging specific financing costs to each country. 
There are several elements affecting government bond yields, we will aggregate them into the 
following macro components: aggregate global risk, risk aversion and liquidity risk, country 
specific risk and contagion risk. The paragraph about country specific risk includes a sub-
section analyzing alternative ways to measure credit risk: Credit Default Swaps and credit 
ratings. 
Literature on European government bond yields is not unanimous attributing weights to these 
different determinants and the time series analyzed present a structural break after the 2007 
global financial crisis. In this review, we will go over models specifying whether they are 
suitable for the period before during and after the crisis. 
 
2.1 Aggregate global risk 
The global component of risk incorporates the uncertainty on the markets across the world; it 
captures the level of perceived risk and its unit price. In crisis conditions, it reflects the loss of 
mutual trust between market agents. Typically, it is measured with the spread between 
corporate triple B US bonds and the Treasury bills as in Codogno et al. (2003), Gerlach et al. 
(2010), De Santis (2012). In other cases, US VIX, the stock market volatility index, was a 
reliable measure. Prior to 2007 financial crisis, international risk was an important factor in 
government bond yields and spread determination. Codogno et al. (2003) provided evidence 
that movements in yield differentials between government bonds explained by international 
risk fluctuations are more evident for Italian and Spanish government bonds. Geyer et al. 
(2004) conducted a research focused on joint dynamics of government yield spreads in EMU; 
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they found out that corporate bond spreads and swap spreads had an important and significant 
impact, meaning that bond yield movements were in line with market aggregate fluctuations. 
For the years of the crisis, Barrios et al. (2009) present an empirical analysis pointing out the 
importance of global aggregate factors in investors’ risk perception and, at the same time, 
highlight the non-negligible incidence of regional determinants, especially risk aversion 
interacted with macroeconomic fundamentals. Perfectly in line with the previous results, 
Sgherri and Zoli (2009) confirm that government bond yields in euro area tend to move 
together, following a common time-varying factor, which represents international risk 
perception. In addition to this, they provide evidence that since October 2008 markets started 
concerning more about other country-specific factors, such as national fiscal fragility and debt 
dynamics, which we will deeper analyze in the following section. Also Favero et al. (2010) 
find a common trend in yield differentials, correlated with a measure of aggregate risk, 
coherent with previous findings. The relation between aggregate global risk and government 
bond yields movements seemed stronger during crisis time, especially for countries that 
already had high levels of public debt. (Haugh et al., 2009). 
According to Gerlach et al. (2010) the aggregate global component is the main driver of bond 
yields, especially when interacted with the bank system dimension. This happens because 
when banking system faces difficulties governments may want to intervene, increasing public 
debt and fiscal imbalances. During the crisis aggregate global risk remained an important 
factor; nonetheless macroeconomic and fiscal variables started to gain more importance. 
According to Zaja et al. (2018), who conducted a research on Croatian bond market 
movements before during and after the crisis, during the second period of the crisis, financial 
and political variables played an important role, while in recovery period macroeconomic 
variables were the most significant. 
In summary global aggregate risk was the most important factor determining the fluctuations 
of government bond yields in the years before 2007; subsequently, the tightening of 




2.2 Risk aversion and liquidity risk 
Risk aversion and liquidity are highly interrelated: when investors perceive a high level of 
risk, the phenomenon of flight to liquidity or flight to safety may occur, Schwarz (2014). Risk 
aversion continuously adjusts in investors’ preference function. In bad times investors’ risk 
aversion and demand for risk premium increase, their willingness to take risks decreases. 
Their preferences may shift towards the safest bonds in terms of credit risk and liquidity. 
Liquidity has to do with the probability to value and trade assets at any time. European 
national bond markets differ in terms of liquidity. Liquidity movements follow pro-cyclical 
patterns, based on transaction intensity in a given time lapse. Factors that determine liquidity 
are market breadth and market depth. The first depends on the volume of buy and sell orders 
issued by market participants in a given time lapse, while the latter is affected by the impact 
that large volume transactions may have on market price. Moreover, the volume of issuance 
and the presence of futures or other hedging instruments influence market liquidity. 
Literature is heterogeneous when assessing the importance of liquidity issues in the 
determination of government bond yields in the euro zone. Again, this is due to the structural 
break that the crisis created. 
According to Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004), Pagano and von Thadden (2004), 
Jankowitsch et al. (2006), liquidity factors play a smaller role as a spread determinant. All 
these papers analyzed the period prior to the crisis, when markets agents had enough 
confidence in EMU’s stability not to be concerned about liquidity issues. 
After the crisis boomed, liquidity became a core component in sovereign bond yield 
determination; Gomez-Puig (2006) studied the relative importance of domestic component of 
euro zone sovereign yield spreads since the start of EMU: the results show a change in value 
of liquidity, measured as market size. Beber et al. (2009) tried to verify whether investors 
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chase more for credit quality or liquidity; their findings show that usually credit quality is 
what matters, though liquidity plays a non-trivial role, especially for low credit risk countries. 
In times of market stress and heightened uncertainty, liquidity is the variable that counts the 
most to determine sovereign bond yields. Perfectly in line with previous findings Manganelli 
and Wolswijk (2009) state that liquidity risk components are significant in their econometric 
model explaining euro system short-term interest rates. 
Nonetheless Favero et al. (2011) take distance from mainstream research, providing empirical 
evidence that liquidity factors, approximated by bid-ask differentials, turn out to be 
insignificant when considered in isolation. 
Monfort and Renne (2013) measured risk aversion using the spread between Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau bank bond and the German Bund. The German government secures both 
bonds, so default risk is the same and the spreads reflects the different liquidity perception 
investors have towards these assets. According to their model, liquidity variables account for 
a sizeable share of sovereign bond yields fluctuations. Schwarz (2014) focuses her research 
on liquidity issues finding that liquidity component weights up to two thirds of sovereign 
spreads. 
To sum up, liquidity and risk aversion weight differently according to the external 
macroeconomic and financial conditions; it seems that in crisis period investors pay more 
attention to these factors. From a policy-maker point of view, the issue is far from being 
irrelevant. If liquidity has sizeable weight in the determination of bond yields, there is scope 
for improving efficiency unifying bond markets at European level. Otherwise, policy-makers 
would better focus on internal factors such as political or fiscal stability in order to stabilize 
the European Monetary Union. 
 
2.3 Country specific risk  
This component includes both default risk and credit risk spread. 
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Default risk is the probability that the issuer fails to meet his obligations: the coupon payment 
or capital repayment at maturity. 
Credit risk spread represents the risk that price of the bond performs on the market worse than 
comparable quality securities; it is the probability that the value of the bond declines more 
than the value of comparable bonds. 
The literature consistently supports the idea that sovereign credit risk weight in government 
bonds yield depends on the financial and macroeconomic framework. For the years prior to 
the crisis, according to Codogno et al. (2003) it was a small but important component. 
Bernoth et al. (2004) conducted a study on euro area and US sovereign bonds: they found that 
fiscal factors, such as debt, deficit and debt-to-service ratio, partly explained spreads. 
Consequently, Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2007) investigated the effects of fiscal imbalances 
(debt and deficit) on long-term sovereign interest rates using a panel of 16 OECD countries. 
They find that a 1% increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio increases contemporaneous long-term 
interest rates by approximately 10 basis points. Moreover, according to their results the 
relationship between debt-to-GDP ratio and sovereign interest rate is non-linear. 
For the crisis period Attinasi et al. (2009) and Barrios et al. (2009) both support the idea that 
internal macroeconomic factors such as debt-to-GDP or deficit-to-GDP ratios, external 
position, growth indicators, industrial production, or borrowing capacity on the primary 
market played a key role. Gerlach et al. (2010) found out that debt-to-GDP current value was 
significant in the determination of bond yields; while for deficit-to-GDP ratio, future 
projections were significant variables. Similarly, Aizenman et al. (2011) using data from both 
inside and outside the EMU, analyzed spread behavior of the weakest economies following 
fiscal fundamentals. They find out that PIIGS’ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) 
spreads were too low before 2007 and too high during the financial crisis. Before the crisis, 
investors’ confidence in the stability of the EMU outmatched fiscal fundamentals, while in the 
following period they incurred in the backlash of the loss of confidence. Default risk was 
based not only on current fiscal fundamentals but also and mostly on the projections of future 
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fiscal position. This means that the surge in spreads after 2007 revealed markets negative 
expectations about the resolution of the crisis. Moreover, according to Attinasi et al. (2009), 
during the crisis, the impact on spread was very significant when fiscal ratios were higher 
than expected; in other words markets reacted enhancing the demand for risk premium when 
fiscal position gets worse than projected. 
Another important aspect to consider is the role of domestic banking sector. Candelon and 
Palm (2010) investigated the liaison between the sub-prime crisis and the sovereign debt 
crisis: it turned out that the banking sector’s fragility had a key role in the contagion for three 
reasons. First, shortages in banks’ liquidity contracted credit to private sector, provoking a 
recession, the slowdown of real economy and the increase of fiscal imbalances. Second, in 
some cases banks bailouts were necessary: governments had to intervene recapitalising banks’ 
balance sheets, raising further public liabilities. Third, the announcement of the bailout itself, 
if perceived as financed through future taxation, reduces the incentive to invest in the real 
sector, lowering growth and future tax revenues. Gerlach et al. (2010), whose research found 
a significant coefficient for the interaction variable between aggregate risk factor and the size 
and structure of national banking sector, find coherent results. 
Achrya et al. (2011) deeply investigated the relationship between financial sector bailout and 
sovereign credit risk using CDS (Credit Default Swap) data for Euro Zone countries for the 
period 2007-2010: they showed that the bailout announcement had an immediate effect 
widening sovereign spreads. Gomez-Bengoechea and Arahuetes (2019) studied the 
relationship between sovereign risk and macroeconomic fundamentals for twelve Euro zone 
countries5 for the period 2000-2012. They prove the existence of a country-sentiment effect 
that affect the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and sovereign risk. 
                                                
5 The authors constructed an unbalanced panel with quarterly data from 2000 to 2012 for the 12 Eurozone 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. They proposed a model that explains spreads through the main categories of variables 
observed in the literature. 
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For what concerns the second period after the crisis, Anzoategui (2018) studied the effect of 
fiscal contraction that characterised Eurozone since 2010, with a focus on the Spanish case. 
His results showed that, contrary to policy-makers’ expectations, austerity did not decrease 
current spreads in sovereign bond yields nor debt-to-GDP ratios. Nonetheless, according to 
the long run model, Spain is more likely to present lower level of debt and spreads. In other 
words, current fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals correlate to future sovereign bond 
yields. This fact may be due to two reasons: first because austerity may have negative effects 
on growth, exacerbating fiscal imbalances in some cases; second because it may have taken 
some time for markets to rebuild confidence after the twofold crisis, financial and, 
subsequently, sovereign.  
In summary, for the pre-crisis period macro-fundamentals did not matter much, with the 
exception of expected budgetary deficits. After 2007, fiscal imbalances became more 
relevant, also interacted with international risk factors. As a reaction, during the crisis markets 
seemed to penalise fiscal and other macroeconomic imbalances much more heavily than 
before, even more than some models predicted. These became the main drivers of spread 
heterogeneity in the post-crisis period. After the global crisis, during the surge of sovereign 
debt crisis, fiscal fundamentals lost some weight in the determination of spreads, mostly 
because markets preferred to act rather conservatively, keeping spreads unaltered in most 
cases. 
In the last twenty years economists encountered heterogeneity in markets’ response to fiscal 
and internal country-specific factors; parameters show instability according to financial and 
macroeconomic framework. 
 
2.3.1 Approaches to measure credit risk  
In the following section, we will go through the instruments to measure credit risk. They are 




Credit risk is affected both by fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Fiscal ratios as debt-to-GDP and deficit-to GDP ratios are the most commonly used measures 
to proxy debt sustainability. It is important to highlight that usually fiscal variables are 
included in the model as expected values, because investors look at the capability of the issuer 
to meet its obligations in the future, at maturity time; therefore, market’s expectations must be 
taken into consideration. This strategy is common to many studies in literature, including 
Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), Gerlach et al. (2010) and Favero and Missale 
(2011). 
Debt-to-GDP is a fiscal ratio expressing the amount of public debt accumulated by the issuer 
as a percentage to Gross Domestic Product. Deficit-to GDP ratio is the ratio expressing the 
relative dimension of deficit (or surplus) accumulated in one year over the amount of GDP. 
A high amount of debt and the accumulation of deficits can make investors doubt about the 
issuer’s capability to meet all its obligations. In this case, the issuer pays a premium for risk 
(higher yield).  
Another important aspect is the functional form between Debt-to-GDP and sovereign bond 
yields: some authors claim it is non-linear and convex, a quadratic factor of the fiscal ratio is 
usually introduced between the explanatory variables, following the suggestions of Bernoth et 
al. (2004), Bernoth and Erdogan (2010), De Grawe and Ji (2012) and Di Cesare et al. (2013). 
 
Macroeconomic fundamentals play an important role when assessing the credit quality of 
country’s issuance. The most important ones are inflation rate, real effective exchange rate 
and GDP growth rate. 
Inflation is an important variable to evaluate an economy’s health conditions. In this 
perspective, it can have an impact on the perceived riskiness of sovereign bonds. In particular, 
inflation shocks are found to affect government bond yields: according to Poghosyan (2012) 
this is mainly due to the “surprise effect”. Moreover, a rise in inflation can be a signal for 
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government’s fiscal undiscipline, therefore higher inflation can be associated with higher 
political instability and sovereign bond yields (Guler and Talasli, 2012). This dynamic 
reverses in case of deflation. 
Another important element is the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate; it should 
capture credit risk caused by general macroeconomic disequilibrium, moreover it is a specific 
measure of external competitiveness. According to Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011), a real 
exchange appreciation reduces markets’ perception of credit risk, and, therefore, spreads. 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) confirmed the result. Real exchange rate expresses a ratio 
relative to a single currency; in order to capture external competitiveness vis à vis the rest of 
the world, Di Cesare et al. (2013) used a trade-weighted mean of real exchange rates 
calculated against the country’s main trading partners. 
Di Cesare et al. (2013) approximate the growth rate of a country using the growth rate of its 
industrial production,. According to Bernoth et al. (2004) sovereign debt becomes riskier in 
phases of economic slowdown: growth usually helps contain debt, for this reason an increase 
in growth performance improves credit worthiness and reduces government bond yields. 
 
2.3.1.2 Credit Default Swaps 
An alternative approach to fundamentals is the credit default swap (CDS). It is a credit 
derivative contract, is a financial derivative that allows investors to offset their credit risk with 
the one of another investor. A credit default swap transfers the credit exposure of fixed 
income products between two or more parties. In a CDS, the buyer of the derivative regularly 
pays to the swap's seller a payment, which takes the name of spread, until the maturity date of 
the contract. In return, the seller agrees to reimburse in case of default or another credit event 
the security’s value and all interest payments until maturity date. From another perspective, a 
CDS works as an insurance contract between two parties, the protection buyer and the seller 
of the contract, against a credit event involving a reference entity. (Byström 2005) The 
reference entity can be a bond or a loan issued by a financial entity or a sovereign institution; 
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the reference’s credit risk unavoidably affects the value of the CDS (Jacobs et al., 2010). 
The CDS contract includes every counterparty risk, its spread is determined both by the 
probability of any credit event of the reference entity and the correlation between this entity 
and the protection seller (Giglio, 2010). Consequently, according to Noeth and Sengupta 
(2012), CDS spread movements are useful to understand how markets price default risk of 
sovereign reference entity. Moreover, Zhan et al. (2005) prove CDS are a good estimator of 
how markets price default risk in the short run because they respond more promptly to credit 
conditions changes compared to credit ratings, which usually take time to adjust. This could 
explain why Callen et al. (2007) observe rather wide variation in CDS spreads. Credit ratings 
cannot fully explain their variation, even if the correlation is strong. The first to the 
relationship between CDS markets and credit ratings were Hull et al. (2004), who 
investigated the extent to which corporate CDS markets anticipate credit rating events. They 
find that anticipation of negative events by the markets is significant and that CDS spreads 
fully reflect the new information the day after a negative event. They do not find any 
significant result for positive events. 
Going beyond these findings, Flannery et al. (2010) tried to verify whether CDS spreads 
could replace credit ratings. There is a structural break in their results: before summer 2007, 
CDS spreads were not very significant about credit risk of the reference entity, while after the 
crisis they started reflecting disclosure, becoming a valid alternative to credit ratings. In line 
with previous research, Jacobs et al. (2010) examined the relationship between CDS spreads 
and credit ratings’ roles clarifying how markets price risks. They ran a survey on Bloomberg 
data about 391 five years CDS contracts over the time lapse 2003-2008; they investigated the 
dependent factors affecting the variation scope of spreads, controlling for ratings. Empirical 
results show that after controlling for market returns, market volatility and interest rates, CDS 
spreads increase with the subordination of the debt instrument, the put-implied volatility or 
deteriorating credit quality of the reference entity.  
More recently, Augustin (2018) highlights the importance of the sign of the slope of CDS 
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spread term structure to signal the effect of global and domestic risk factors on sovereign risk. 
Analysing cross-country heterogeneity across 44 countries, he finds that global risk shocks 
affect CDS spreads if the term structure is positively sloped, while domestic determinants 
matter more when the slope is negative. 
CDS spreads and credit quality of the issuer are strictly related, as literature proved in many 
ways; unfortunately they trade on the markets where episodes of financial speculation are not 
so rare and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the “market effect” and the “credit 
quality effect”. For this reason, CDS often serve as a benchmark, a tool to use to compare to 
traditional methodologies (aka fundamentals approach), to evaluate credit quality of an issuer, 
because market experts do not perceive it as enough reliable. 
 
2.3.1.3 Credit ratings  
The third approach exploits credit rating. Rating agencies base their assessment on the 
issuer’s credit quality using both public information available on the market and reserved 
information at their exclusive disposal. The best-known rating agencies that market agents 
take into consideration are Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch and DBRS. The downgrade 
risk is the probability of a credit rating agency worsening an issuer’s valuation.  
In normal times, rating agencies assess issuers’ credit quality on a six-monthly basis. Once a 
rating agency has analyzed an issuer’s credibility, its valuation consists of three “actions”. 
The most commonly known is the rating, which is the valuation of credit quality expressed 
through a specific scale. The rating comes with the outlook, which is almost as important; it 
consists in three possible results: positive, negative or neutral. It expresses a valuation on the 
future projection of the issuer’s credit quality, meaning that it embodies the expectations of 
the rating agency on future ratings. A negative outlook means that the rating agency envisages 
a future downgrade with a discrete probability. The third action is putting on an issuer the 
“under observation” label, which means that the rating agency has negative expectations 
about future ratings. 
 31 
All these actions and announcement may have an impact on market perception of issuers’ 
credit quality and, therefore, market prices. 
Theoretically, the intuition that ratings can explain price movements is controversial. If 
ratings and market participants had the same information, prices and ratings would 
incorporate the same information, mostly based on fiscal fundamentals. Nonetheless, most 
econometric researches find a causality nexus between rating and prices. This happens 
because market participants look at ratings when making investment decisions or review their 
market allocation afterwards. Moreover, institutional investors are compelled to hold 
securities of a certain level of seniority, depending on their rating. Banks’ balance sheets need 
to keep investment grade assets as collaterals in order to receive loans by other institutions. 
The literature is homogeneous supporting the idea that a causal nexus between credit ratings 
and market prices exists: De Santis (2012) provided evidence that in empirical models 
explaining spreads, credit ratings are statistically significant and economically sizeable. 
Altman et al. (2004) focused on clarifying the process and timing through which rating 
agencies formulate their judgments. Ratings are measures that tend to be rather stable over 
time; this happens because they aim to be long run oriented. According to the authors, long 
run factors count the most. Ratings change only if the difference between current credit rating 
and the one the models envisage exceeds a certain threshold.  
Moreover, the causality issue along different dimensions as direction and intensity interested 
researchers. Afonso et al. (2012) provided two important results, working on data from 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch at European level. First, spreads react to rating 
downgrading mostly in the first two weeks after the shock; second, the causality is large and 
significant in both directions: ratings affect government bond yields and vice versa. Ferri et 
al. (1999), studying East Asian countries, investigated double-sided causality, which can 
trigger pro-cyclical patterns. According to their results, downgrading had a more than 
expected negative effect, basing the analysis only on fiscal fundamentals, so they claim that 
the consequent international capital flight exacerbated the crisis. Another important point 
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worth highlighting is the fact that rating agencies failed to envisage the crisis coming; 
consequently, in the following years, their judgments became quite conservative in order to 
regain lost credibility. 
Nonetheless pro-cyclical behavior of the price-rating relationship was questioned by Mora 
(2006), claiming that ratings are rather sticky. In the pre-crisis period, they have been higher 
than expected, during the crisis they remained almost the same, and poorly increased in post-
crisis phase. Moreover, they found out that ratings react to non-macroeconomic factors such 
as lagged spreads. Therefore, the author argues that ratings cannot have pro-cyclical effects if 
they only react to available macroeconomic and market information. 
 
2.4 Contagion risk 
The last determinant of government bond yields is contagion risk which has no unique 
definition in literature; some economists say it is the covariance of some variables under 
specific external conditions and measures the transmission of a negative shock (e.g., from one 
country to another) Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo, Rigobon (2014). Some others claim 
contagion is the different propagation of a shock and try to quantify its effects. Gande and 
Parsley (2005) studied contagion effect based on credit ratings on the time lapse 1991-2000 
for thirty-four countries6. Their results showed the presence of asymmetric contagion, 
meaning that positive shifts in ratings had no effect on spreads, while negative ones had a 
significant impact, measured around twelve base points per step of rating. 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) found evidence of contagion effect in the euro zone, 
                                                
6 The only criterion for inclusion in their data set was the existence of publicly traded U.S. dollar denominated 
sovereign debt as of March 2001. The thirty-four countries meeting this criterion were Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Philippines, Poland, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
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especially among periphery countries. In particular, they show that in the first phase of the 
crisis, contagion originated mainly from Greek sovereign risk, while the following period is 
characterised by multiple sources. 
Arezki et al. (2012) made an interesting point: “contagion effect is more important and 
persistent the lower the rating grade of the concerned country”. This result suggests a non-
linear relationship between the variables. When they examined contagion effect after a 
downgrade in Euro Zone for the period 2007-2010, they found it significant across countries 
and financial markets. The dimension of the impact varies according to country and rating 
agency. Lastly, they found that downgrading to “speculative grade” gives rise to systemic 
contagion. 
Contagion is certainly imputable to the high degree of financial integration lacking a euro 
denominated safe asset that characterizes the European Monetary Union, as Brunnermeir et 
al. (2011) highlighted. When banks needed safe assets as collaterals, because of Basel 
regulation, they demanded for highly rated sovereign bonds of euro zone countries. As long as 
investors had confidence in governments’ capabilities to fulfil their obligations the EMU kept 
in good equilibrium. With the advent of the crisis markets started concerning about 
governments’ creditworthiness, weakening also European banking system stability. A tight 
relationship between governments and banking systems was established, the so-called “doom 
loop” mechanism. Empirical studies found evidence of this link. 
According to Acharya et al. (2014) sovereign and bank credit default swaps tend to co-move 
and influence each other more than models based on common factors, such as market 
volatility or financial and macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, the size of sovereign and 
bank CDS spreads and their correlation is higher in fiscally weaker countries, meaning that 
the link is tighter in highly indebted countries. Furthermore, in most models the link is two-
way and contagion is stronger in countries with larger financial sector and higher share of 
highly bank-intermediated finance. Bottero et al. (2016) proved that the higher the share of 
sovereign assets in banks’ balance sheets, the stronger is contagion effect. 
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Sensoy et al. (2019) investigated the dynamic integration and network structure of the EMU 
sovereign bond markets; they uncovered a high degree of integration before the 2007 
financial crisis, while segmentation emerged afterwards. 
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3. A model for debt dynamics 
Despite the fact that the Eurobond project came to the light, the debate about this proposal has 
never really terminated among economists. In the recent years, the main question about the 
topic was whether the introduction of a debt mutualization instrument could help stabilize 
debt across Euro Zone7. Our objective is to move beyond fiscal stabilization per se, as we try 
to build a model showing that the Janus Eurobond can play an important role in the 
immunization of the European Monetary Union to exogenous shocks. In our perspective, it is 
particularly interesting to assess whether the introduction of a debt mutualization instrument, 
in the Janus Eurobond form, could reduce the expected variance of simulated debt levels, 
increasing EMU’s resilience to exogenous shocks. 
In our analysis, we will partly follow the strategy of Tielens et al. (2014) who assessed the 
impact of a Eurobond8 on debt dynamics of three peripheral states: Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. In particular, they showed the simulated gains under a “full-fledged Eurobond 
scenario” compared to the “baseline scenario”. 
In the following, we will set up a model describing debt dynamics in two different scenarios, 
namely a baseline scenario, which fits historical data, and its counterfactual, the Janus 
Eurobond scenario. We will run the model in both scenarios for three countries: Italy France 
and Germany. These represent of each “macro-fiscal area” in the Euro Zone; which are 
                                                
7 Baglioni and Cherubini (2016) showed the possibility to reduce the overall cost of servicing the 
public debt, splitting it into senior and junior tranches and coupling it with cross-guarantees across 
Euro Zone countries. Van Aarle et al. (2018) compared debt stabilization in the monetary union under 
two scenarios: a national fiscal discipline regime against a Eurobond regime, in both regimes financial 
markets impose a risk premium based respectively on each country’s government debt level in the first 
case; on the average debt level in monetary union in the latter. 
8 In their model, the Eurobond has the structure suggested by Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010). For 
further details see paragraph 1.4. 
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respectively the periphery, the intermediate and the core area. 
 
3.1 The model framework 
The first element to define when building a model for debt dynamics is a law of motion of 
debt. The classical structure of the government budget constraint in the literature is the 
following: 
Bt = Bt-1 (1 + it) – Gt – Tt     (1) 
Where Bt is the stock of debt at time t, Bt-1 is the stock of debt at t-1, it is the nominal interest 
rate at time t, Gt is government expenditure and Tt is government revenues, both at time t. 
Dividing each element of this formulation by (1 + Yt)9, we get the law of motion of debt-to-
GDP ratio. 
bt = bt-1 / [(1 + πt) (1 + gt)] + intt - pbt   (2) 
Where: 
- bt is the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t 
- πt is the inflation rate at time t 
- gt is the rate of growth of GDP at time t 
- intt is the interest expenditure, calculated as percentage to GDP, at time t 
- pbt is the primary balance, calculated as percentage to GDP, at time t 
Equation (1) shows that debt-to-GDP dynamics depend both on macroeconomic and fiscal 
variables. It diverges from the traditional formulation of debt equation where the product of 
the stock of debt and the nominal interest rate appears. In the formulation above, instead, the 
interest expenditure captures the average cost of debt, which depends on the maturity of the 
sovereign bonds emitted, and its long run dynamics depending on public debt management. 
                                                
9 (1 + Yt) = [(1 + πt) (1 + gt)] 
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The interest expenditure is computed as the difference of the primary balance and the overall 
fiscal balance (both measured as percentage to GDP), from a budget identity10. This way we 
avoid the problem of the average cost of debt estimation, which crucially depends on the 
maturity structure of emitted debt. 
3.2 The VAR methodology 
In order to be able to design the debt dynamics of different Eurozone countries under different 
scenarios we need an econometric model allowing us to capture the co-movements of the 
variables in the economic system. A suitable strategy when modeling and explaining the 
interactions among a group of time series variables is the Vector Auto Regressive method. 
Multivariate time series analysis is very common in quantitative macroeconomics, as it allows 
to treat jointly all the endogenous variables entered in the model. The model’s output 
highlights the correlation between the variables without seeking for a causal link; it simply 
describes the interactions and co-movements of the variables in a system. For this reason, it is 
particularly useful in data description and forecasting future values of the variables in the 
system, Stock and Watson (2001). 
A VAR model of order p is a multivariate autoregressive linear model11, in which each of the 
n-variables is function of its lagged values up to p periods, as well as in terms of the lagged 
values of the remaining n-1 variables, plus a serially uncorrelated error term. Thus, its general 
specification is:  
Yt = A0 + A1Yt-1 + A2Yt-2 +…+ ApYt-p + Ut   (3) 
With t = 0, ±1, ±2… 
                                                
10 The overall fiscal balance is the total government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-). The overall 
fiscal balance is the difference between primary balance and is the interest expenditure. Reversing this 
formulation we obtain INT = PB –OB. For further details see Fedelino et al. (2009).  
11 For further details see Stock and Watson (2001). 
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Where: 
- Yt is an (m x 1) vector containing each of the m variables of the VAR 
- A0 is an (m x 1) vector of intercepts terms 
- Ai is an (m x m) matrixes of coefficients, with i = 1,2,...,p 
- Ut = (m x 1) vector of uncorrelated white noise disturbances, with E (Ut) = 0, 
 E (Ut U’t) = ∑u and E (Ut U’s) = 0 for s ≠  t. 
The model is required to be stable in order to conduct correct inference. The stability 
condition is analogue to the univariate autoregressive case: all included variables need to be 
weakly stationary, i.e. with stochastic initial condition all the roots of the characteristic 
equation, or eigenvalues12, of the lag polynomial are outside the unit circle. 
det (Ik – A1z – A2 z2 – …  – Ap zp) ≠  0 for |z| ≤ 1 
In general the process Ut is assumed to be Gaussian white noise that is Ut ~ (0, ∑u ) for all t. In 
order to estimate the VAR (p) process and its parameters we will use the traditional OLS 
estimation. 
3.3 The baseline scenario 
Now that the general framework of a VAR model is set up, we can proceed applying it to the 
time series of the variables of interest. Data were collected from 2000-Q1, introduction of the 
Euro as “book money” to 2019-Q2. 
A dataset was with the following quarterly time series: 
- GDP GROWTH RATE in percentage change on the same period of the previous year 
- HICP the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices in percentage change on the same      
period of the previous year  
- IRT is the nominal interest rate of the 10 years Italian government bond (BTP) 
                                                
12 For further details see Kirchgassner and Wolters (2007). 
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- IE is the interest expenditure as percentage of GDP 
- PB is the primary balance as percentage of GDP 
The GDP growth rate, the HICP and the nominal interest rate are taken from the OECD 
database, Primary Balance from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and the Interest 
Expenditure is calculated using the Overall Balance13 (total government net lending (+) / net 
borrowing (-)) provided by Eurostat. 
In line with the literature, we prefer to treat all the five variables in the model endogenously, 
in order to account for any kind of interaction between them. Moreover, we will include the 
nominal interest rate of the 10-years government bonds of the country involved; this choice is 
defendable even if the nominal interest rate does not appear in equation (2) directly, it proved 
to be a very significant factor affecting the other variables of the macroeconomic system 
whose interactions are the object of our research. Tielens et al. (2014) used this approach; 
according to the authors, inserting the nominal interest rate in the vector of the endogenous 
variables directly, would enable us to capture some interactions between this variable and the 
others we use in the model specification. Instead, the debt-to-GDP ratio is excluded because, 
given eq. (2), the information we put in the model already embodies debt dynamics. Thus, 
including the fiscal variable would over-specify the model, not allowing for a stochastic 
estimation of debt dynamics, otherwise it would be deterministic. 
Figure A.1 shows the time paths of Interest Expenditure, Primary Balance, Inflation rate 
(HICP) and Growth rate. Before running the Vector Auto Regressive model, we perform the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the time series in order to exclude any unit root issue, which 
would compromise weak stationary condition, which is necessary for the model’s stability. 
The ADF test’s null hypothesis is that of unit root of the time series. 
Figure A.2 displays the unit root tests for the variables mentioned above. We reject the null 
                                                
13  See note 10. 
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for growth, inflation, Primary Balance at 1% significance level while for Interest Expenditure, 
at 5% significance level. In the case of nominal interest the test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root; therefore we take the first difference of this variable14 to rule out any 
stationarity issue due to unit root problems. 
Before setting up the VAR model, we run some lag-length selection tests; the AIC criterion15 
suggests to include two lags in the specification. 
 
We proceed specifying the baseline VAR model: 
Yt = A0 + A1Yt-1 + A2Yt-2 + εt       (4) 
Yt = [IntExpt, PBt, Inft, Grot, Fdirt]’ 
E (εt,εt’) = Ω 
εt  N (0, Ω) 
After the model’s estimation, we need to check whether all the roots of the characteristic lag 
polynomial equation lie inside the unit circle, i.e. if their modulus are lower than one. The 
model proves to be stable. Other post-estimation diagnostics involve residuals: we have to test 
for autocorrelation and normality. For the Lagrange-multiplier test, we accept the null 
hypothesis of no evidence of residual autocorrelation at lag order. Similarly, we accept the 
null hypothesis of normality running the Jarque-Bera test. 
The VAR estimation lets us examine the contemporaneous and retarded interactions of the 
variables involved in the system. It captures the co-movements without the constraints of a 
                                                
14  “Fdirt” in table A.3 stands for first differenced nominal interest rate. 
15  The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is an estimator of out-of-sample prediction error. It is 
useful to evaluate the relative quality of statistical models for a given set of data. It is defined as 
follows:  AIC = 2k – 2 ln (Lmax), where k is the number of estimated parameters in the model and Lmax 





An interesting way of seeing how the variables influence each other over time is the Impulse 
Response Function analysis. IRFs highlight the reaction of a given variable to the movement 
of the same or another variable in the model. Figure A.3 shows the responses, estimated for 
eight periods ahead, to any variable’s impulse for the Italian case. 
The first difference of the nominal interest rate seems quite resilient to its own and other 
variables’ shocks. We go through a few of the most interesting ones, just to have an insight on 
how the model evaluates the time interactions between the endogenous variables and we try to 
interpret the model’s predictions. 
GDP growth reacts quite negatively to increases in Fdirt, Inf, while it is positively correlated 
with the Primary Balance. These results are coherent with economic theory: when the nominal 
interest rate grows, ceteris paribus, we expect interest expenditure to rise, increasing Deficit 
and accumulated Debt, threatening future perspective of growth. A rise in Inflation, 
considering its erosion effect on consumers’ purchase power, may imply a future slowdown 
of GDP growth. On the other side, a rise in Primary Balance may represent an increased 
availability of resources to invest in the real sector. 
Inflation rate reacts positively to an increase in growth rate: when aggregate demand grows 
faster than supply, prices tend to increase. 
Interest Expenditure responds to an Fdirt impulse firstly with a slight decrease, then a few 
years of clear positive trend and then it stabilizes. 
Relying on the implicit assumption that our VAR model captures the functioning of the 
macroeconomic system for the given set of variables and that its parameters will remain 
constant for the future years, we allow it to forecast the values of the endogenous variables for 
42 quarters ahead (until Quarter 120, the end of  2029). 
Once forecasted the endogenous variables future values and standard deviation, we used 
equation (2) to compute the forecast of debt dynamics and its variance, which is a function of 
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every component’s variance and the cross-correlations. With all these elements at disposal, 
we can now show the estimated dynamics of Debt/GDP ratio for Italy (figure A.4), France 
(figure A.6) and Germany (figure A.8). 
The time lapse considered, as mentioned before, is from January 2000 to June 2019 for the 
historical estimation of the model, then we will forecast for 42 quarters ahead, from July 2019 
to December 2029. 
The baseline scenario of the model forecasts a stable path for the Italian Debt-to-GDP ratio: a 
slight initial decrease followed by a moderate increase. When considering the estimated 
confidence interval of the distribution, which has a range of about 100 percentage points at 
the end of the time period considered, we clearly see that the analysis is nothing but 
conclusive about future paths of Italian debt; it could decrease, stabilize or get on an explosive 
path. 
As far as France is concerned, we can be much more confident that its Debt-to-GDP ratio will 
not follow an explosive trend. The graph shows a clearly decreasing median forecasted value; 
the confidence interval takes into account also the states of the world in which French debt 
does not decrease, but remains on a stable path with a 95% significance level. 
The forecast we computed highlight that Germany could extinguish its debt in a few years: 
negative values of the Debt-to-GDP ratio lie inside the confidence interval. Nonetheless, it is 
much more probable that the German government will try to keep debt stable, and reinvest the 
accumulated resources. In any case, this graph shows that the German fiscal and 
macroeconomic system lies on a stable paths. 
We now set up the Janus Eurobond scenario, taking into account the introduction of a debt 
mutualization mechanism at the beginning of the European monetary Union. 
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3.4 The Janus Eurobond scenario 
We now proceed setting up a model for Janus Eurobond scenario to compare to the baseline 
one: the comparison between the two should let us evaluate if the introduction of a common 
debt instrument could be beneficial to Euro Zone countries increasing the immunization of the 
system to contagion effects after exogenous shocks. 
In an ideal world, we would be able to go back in time to the beginning of the European 
Monetary Union and create a debt mutualization mechanism in the form we envisaged. The 
entire macroeconomic system would change somehow. Building a counterfactual VAR model 
strictu sensu it could be possible to capture how the Janus Eurobond could affect debt 
dynamics. Unfortunately, this is clearly impossible, but it is useful to think of this as a 
benchmark to try to get the closest possible to. 
Our approach to build the Janus Eurobond scenario follows the suggestion of Tielens et al. 
(2014). The authors, when setting up the Eurobond scenario, considered the fact that at the 
beginning of the European Monetary Union the 10-years government bonds interest rates 
were very similar across Europe. Markets confidence in the stability of the EMU created the 
conditions we could assimilate to a “virtual Eurobond”, i.e. the situation was similar to that 
we imagine if the common debt instrument existed. In other words, macroeconomic 
conditions were such that international risk factors could explain interest rates levels, while 
country- specific macroeconomic and fiscal variables affecting credit risk had an almost 
negligible weight.16 Figure 1 shows the spreads on German Bund across some Euro Zone 
countries for the period 1990-2011. Before 2000, spreads differentiated, taking into account 
country-specific the macroeconomic, fiscal and political framework. After the beginning of 
the European Monetary Union this differences in spreads disappeared; the “EMU effect” was 
such that most countries payed the interest German rate on their debt. 
History proved markets wrong: after 2007 crisis, confidence in the stability of the EMU 
                                                
16 See section 2.1 and 2.2. 
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started to falter, and spreads began to rise. 
Figure 1: 10 years government bond spreads on German Bund (%) 
 
Source: Favero and Missale (2012) 
The EMU in its original design was not enough immune to shocks; its internal weakness 
became clear to every market agent and, in the following years, some countries faced a proper 
sovereign debt crisis. 
According to Tielens et al. (2014) the spread situation in the years 2000-2007 should reflect 
what would happen in a Eurobond scenario: in fact, the situation was such that all Euro Zone 
countries payed a unique interest rate: the German rate on Bund. 
Therefore, in their opinion the most accurate proxy for the Eurobond basis interest is the Bund 
rate, because markets perceive it as the safest asset in Europe. 
Their Eurobond scenario is set up substituting the country’s sovereign bond rate with the rate 
on 10 years German government bond. This action is justified by the argument above and the 
fact that the rate of the Eurobond, which is an instrument built to become a safe-asset, will be 
reasonably close to that of the German Bund. The approach used by Tielens et al. (2014) is 
that of running a VAR model, leaving all other variables unchanged. The straightforward 
objection is that the other variables never really interacted with the Eurobond rate, thus the 
VAR would be trying to capture some interactions that never existed. Despite this limit is 
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certainly justified, we can partially overcome it for the years before 2007 crisis: during those 
times, each country in the euro zone was emitting debt almost at the German rate. For the 
years following 2007, this argument is no longer true, but we have to accept the restraint of 
this model. 
Tielens et al. (2014) evaluate the effect of a Eurobond in the form of Delpla and von 
Weizsäcker (2010)17, so their model evaluates the scenario in which all debt belongs to the 
senior tranche. 
Instead, we will build a model set up for Janus Eurobond, which better controls for moral 
hazard issues.18 We will use their approach to proxy the basis interest, which is the rate at 
which the Janus Eurobond would trade on the markets, and we will add a country-specific 
Premium. The sum of these two components will become one of the endogenous variables in 
the VAR model, substituting the nominal interest rate (IRT). 
The premium’s design is inspired to the Maastricht fiscal rules19 requiring EMU members not 
to exceed 60% of Debt/GDP ratio and 3% of Deficit/GDP ratio. It is the weighted average of 
the deviations to the fiscal parameters of the Treaty on European Union (1992). 
We chose weights looking at the estimated coefficients for fiscal variables in the literature 
analysing the determinants of spreads. We find particularly suitable for our setting the work 
of Favero and Missale (2012) because they regress the spread to the Bund rate of ten Euro 
Zone countries on a set of deviations to the German variables, including fiscal ratios, using 
weekly data for the period June 2006 - June 2011. At that time, markets had a disciplining 
role on Euro Zone countries, and fiscal ratios had a significant weight. 
We take the average of the coefficients of the countries analysed in the paper: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands Spain and Portugal. 
                                                
17 See section 1.4. 
18 See section 1.5. 
19 See the document: Council and Commission of the European Communities. (1992). Treaty on European 
Union. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Luxembourg. 
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Conceptually we build a synthetic measure of markets’ discipline based on fiscal ratios, 
exploiting the contribution of literature. 
We define the Premium (P) as follows: 
Pt = 0.0475*(Debtt-4 /GDPt-4 – 60%) +0.0022*(Deficitt-4/GDPt-4 – 3%)    (5) 
Now we proceed adding to the 10 years German government bond rate, the Premium, the sum 
obtained represents the effective Janus Eurobond interest rate. 
Then we run the ADF test for the newly built variable Janusrt, which, similarly to the 
nominal interest rate of the baseline scenario, suffers a unit-root condition. Therefore, we 
prefer to include in the set of our explanatory variables the first difference of the Janus 
Eurobond rate (Fdjanusrt). 
The VAR model’s specification for the Janus Eurobond scenario is: 
Yt = A0 + A1Yt-1 + A2Yt-2 + εt       (6) 
Yt = [IntExpt, PBt, Inft, Grot, Fdjanusrtt]’ 
E (εt,εt’) = Ω 
εt  N (0, Ω) 
In the German case, the baseline scenario and the Janus Eurobond scenario virtually coincide, 
because the effective Janus Eurobond interest rate would be equal to the 10 years nominal 
government bond yield.20 Therefore, we set up only two VAR models: for Italy and France. 
Right after running the VAR model we need to check its stability: all the roots of the 
characteristic lag polynomial equation lie inside the unit circle. 
As far as residuals’ diagnostics tests are concerned, again we can accept the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation at lag order (Lagrange multiplier test) and of normality (Jarque-Bera). 
We do not find any issue running the diagnostic tests for each of them. 
                                                
20 If we ran the Janus Eurobond model for Germany we get: Janusrtt = IRTt (Bund) + Pt (Germany). 
The Premium would be null because of its design, therefore we get: IRTt (Bund) = Janusrtt. The 
baseline and the Janus Eurobond models coincide for Germany. 
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Once checked the suitability of the Janus Eurobond VAR models, we apply the technique 
previously used in the baseline scenario.  We compute the forecast of the endogenous 
variables for 42 quarters ahead. Then, using equation (2) we obtain the forecast of debt-to-
GDP dynamics for the three countries. Table 1 shows the comparison of the last median 
forecasted value of debt-to-GDP (Q4-2029) and last Confidence Interval, for the two 
scenarios. 
Table 1: Baseline vs. Janus Eurobond _ last observation 
 Baseline value Janus value CI Baseline CI Janus Eurobond 
Italy 135,9% 57,6% 100,8% 83,6% 
France 44,6% 44,5% 78,4% 72,9% 
Germany 23% . 103,4% . 
 
Figure A.5a displays the estimated path for Italian Debt-to-GDP ratio in the Janus Eurobond 
scenario, i.e. under the hypothesis that a bi-faced mutualization debt instrument has been 
operative since the beginning of the EMU project. When comparing the two scenarios, we see 
that the Janus Eurobond would have a twofold effect on debt dynamics. First on the median 
forecasted value of debt-to-GDP; in the latter case Italian debt would follow a decreasing and 
sustainable path. A reduced Interest Expenditure may be one of the main causes, even if the 
Janus Eurobond rate accounts for credit risk in the Premium equation, it is reasonable that a 
peripheral country as Italy would pay less than in the baseline scenario, benefitting from the 
stability of the safe asset. However, the main result we are interested in is the estimated 
variance of forecasted values; in the Janus Eurobond scenario, the Confidence Interval is 17,2 
%smaller than in the baseline scenario. This simple comparison seems supporting the 
theoretical argument according to which the common debt instrument would increase 
immunization in the European Monetary Union, helping prevent contagion across Euro Zone 
countries. 
The French case (figure A.7a) shows very little difference between the two scenarios in the 
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median forecasted values of debt, which was already stable in the baseline one.  
Coherently with the Italian results, the confidence interval of the fiscal ratio is smaller in the 
Janus Eurobond scenario.  Again this is explicable considering the fact that the design of the 
European safe asset could help insulate spreads dynamics from the erratic movements of 
sovereign bond yields, which are due to markets’ sentiments and fears, instead of 
fundamentals and rationality. 
 
3.5 An Extension: Premium corrected for growth 
In this section we will consider an extension of the Janus Eurobond model, taking into 
account a Premium corrected for Growth. The necessity to build a Premium that accounts for 
GDP growth comes from the fact that EU institutions monitors the dynamics of structural 
budget positions across Member states. The structural budget balance is a nominal budget 
balance adjusted by a cyclical component, excluding one-shot and temporary policy 
measures. The cyclical component is the product of the output gap21 and a parameter 
reflecting the automatic reaction of the government balance to an output gap change. In other 
words it is a way to express the expected budget position if the economy was at full potential, 
(Economic Governance support Unit, 2019). 
In our previous analysis we built the Premium using the deviation of primary balance to the 
3% threshold of Maastricht criteria. 
We extend the formulation of the Premium adding a penalisation for Growth, which will have 
a positive weight in the formulation because a positive value of growth represents the 
possibility for a government to use the resources coming from economic growth to stabilize 
its debt dynamics. In this perspective, adding to the Premium a penalisation for growth is in 
line with the idea of the structural budget position. 
We define the Adjusted Premium (AP) as follows: 
                                                
21 Output gap is the difference between actual and potential GDP, as percentage of GDP. 
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APt = 4,75% * (Debtt-4 / GDPt-4 – 60%) + 0,22% * (Deficitt-4 / GDPt-4 – 
3%) + γ* (Grot-4 –Grot-5 )          
  (7) 
 
Therefore we account for Growth using an additive term function of the first difference of 
growth. In this context, the value of the coefficient γ is of little interest; the main objective is 
to evaluate the model’s reaction and test whether previous results are robust to the adjustment. 
We tried different weights, finding homogeneous and consistent results. We now present the 
results model of the extension with γ = 10%. 
Table 2: Baseline vs. Janus Eurobond b (Premium Adjusted for Growth)_ last observation 
 Baseline value Janus b  CI baseline CI Janus b 
Italy 135,9% 57,9% 100,8% 95,3% 
France 44,6% 45,3% 78,4% 79,2% 
 
Figure A.5b shows the evolution of the Italian debt-to-GDP forecasted value; the median 
value follows the same trend of the unadjusted case, with a clear decreasing trend, leading the 
Italian fiscal position to a sustainable path. The confidence interval is larger than the 
unadjusted case, but it remains smaller than the baseline scenario. 
The French debt-to-GDP (figure A.7b) has a very similar evolution of the median forecasted 
value in all three scenarios: Baseline, Janus Eurobond and Janus Adjusted. The confidence 
interval is slightly larger for the Janus Adjusted scenario. 
This extension showed that the evolution of debt for the Eurobond scenario does not 
substantially change when the Premium accounts for growth. Therefore, using the structural 
budget position instead of the primary balance in the Premium equation would not radically 
change our conclusions about the effectiveness of the Janus Eurobond as an instrument for 
immunization of the European Monetary Union. 
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3.6 A focus on interest expenditure 
A significant critique to the Janus design could be that charging lower interest rates would 
represent an implicit transfer from core Euro Zone countries to intermediate and periphery. 
For this reason, we now focus on the dynamics of the interest expenditure in the two scenarios 
for Italy and France. 
For the Italian case (figure A.9), Interest Expenditure in the Janus Eurobond scenario is 
permanently lower than in Baseline. As far as standard deviation is concerned (figure A.10), it 
remains consistently lower in the debt mutualization mechanism scenario. This considered, 
one may object that main determinant of the difference between the debt dynamics in baseline 
and Janus Eurobond scenario (figure A.4 versus figure A.5) is the difference in Interest 
Expenditure; meaning that Italian debt stabilizes only as a result of an implicit transfer from 
other countries. 
In order to verify this hypothesis, we run a reversed exercise: we upward change the weights22 
of the fiscal determinants in the Premium, so that Interest Expenditure increases. We repeat 
the substitution until we find a coefficient that brings Interest Expenditures close to the 
baseline one’s value (figure A.9c). Computing the new debt dynamics, we can evaluate the 
effect of Janus design, without taking into account a reduction of Interest Expenditure.  
Table 3: Baseline vs. Janus Eurobond c (Modified Premium)_ last oservation 
 Baseline value Janus c  CI baseline CI Janus b 
Italy 135,9% 61,9% 100,8% 83,6% 
 
Figure A.5c and table 3 show that Italian debt stabilizes in the “Modified Premium” scenario, 
even if it decreases at a slower rate than the regular Janus Eurobond scenario. In any case, the 
                                                
22 The computed coefficients are the original values of coefficients in equation (5),multiplied by 1,14, 
so we obtain the Modified Premium: 
MPt  = 0.05415*(Debtt-4 /GDPt-4 – 60%) +0.002508*(Deficitt-4/GDPt-4 – 3%). 
. 
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variability remains considerably lower than the baseline scenario; therefore, we conclude that 
the Janus design is effective even without necessarily implying a lowered interest 
expenditure. This is exactly what happens in the French case, where Interest Expenditures 
(figure A.11) follow opposite patterns for the first 4 years (until Quarter 96), then they 
converge to a unique and stable value, with the Janus Interest Expenditure slightly higher than 
the baseline one. Nonetheless, figure A.12 shows that the estimated standard deviation of the 
Interest Expenditure in the Janus scenario remains consistently lower than the baseline 
standard deviation of Interest Expenditure. 
 
This considered, we conclude that the Janus Eurobond may be effective stabilizing debt 
levels, even without implying transfers from core or intermediate countries to peripheral ones. 
For this reason, the Janus Eurobond proposal could be an attractive programme also from a 
political perspective. Clearly, Euro Zone countries would be willing to implement a debt 
mutualization scheme on condition that it represents a Pareto-improvement for each 
participant. The results we found seem pointing out the possibility to build a Janus Eurobond 




4. Comparative statics 
In the following section, we will focus on the main object of interest: the variance of the 
estimated variables. Table 1 showed that the confidence intervals are consistently lower for 
the Janus Eurobond scenario; this seems supporting our theory according to which the Janus 
Eurobond could help immunize the EMU from shocks. However, the difference in estimated 
variance simply reflects the difference in the error of estimation, while we are interested in the 
variability of the forecasted variable in the system. These two quantities undoubtedly 
correlate; nonetheless, the comparison between the estimated standard error may not be the 
most adequate method to evaluate differences in variability. We will run the models 
previously built exposing them to exogenous shocks. In particular, we will try to evaluate the 
degree of immunization of the European Monetary Union in the different scenarios. 
4.1 Monetary shock 
The first shock we consider is a rise in inflation. We consider a permanent shock whose 
dimension is a standard deviation for each period t so that the effects on debt dynamics are 
more relevant looking and the graphs. 
The expected response of the debt dynamics models after a rise in inflation is a decrease in 
the median estimated value of debt-to-GDP ratio; this result is straightforward from equation 
(2). 
Table 4: Baseline vs. Janus Eurobond responses to monetary shocks_ last observation 
 Baseline value Janus value Baseline CI Janus CI 
Italy 97,8% 41,5 % 100,8% 83,6% 
France 38,6% 34,2% 78,4% 72,9% 
Germany 18% . 103,4% . 
 
Figure A.13 and A.14 confirm our prediction: in both scenarios, the Italian Debt-to-GDP 
median forecasted value takes values, which are lower than the no-shock case presented in the 
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previous chapter. 
The main result we are interested in is the reaction of the confidence interval to the shock: the 
baseline scenario presents an estimated variability of results that reaches 100,8%, while in the 
Janus Eurobond scenario it is 83,6%. 
The French case (figure A.15 and A.16) presents consistent results: in both scenarios the debt-
to-GDP ratios estimates are lower after the monetary shock than in the no-shock case; the 
median shocked forecasted values are close, however,  the estimated variabilities are 
respectively 78,4% for the baseline and 72,9% for the Janus Eurobond. 
Though its limited utility for our comparative analysis, we shocked also the German model 
(figure A.17), which confirms that a rise in inflation would help reduce even more the debt-to-
GDP ratio. 
 
4.2 Real shock 
The second shock we consider is a GDP growth slowdown. Once again, we consider a 
permanent shock whose dimension is a standard deviation for each period t. 
From a theoretical perspective, we expect to see a deterioration of debt conditions. 
Table 4: Baseline vs. Janus Eurobond responses to real shocks_ last observation 
 Baseline value Janus value Baseline CI Janus CI 
Italy 258% 105,6% 101% 84,1% 
France 65,5% 64,6% 78,2% 73,3% 
Germany 49,4% . 102,6% . 
 
In fact, figure A.18 shows an explosive path for the median forecasted value of Italian debt-to-
GDP, while in the Janus Eurobond scenario (figure A.19) it is high, but it keeps stable around 
the interval 100% - 120%. The variability of estimates is, once again, lower for the second 
scenario: respectively 101% against 84,1%. 
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For the French case (figure A.20 and A.21), the trend of the median values almost coincides: 
the reduction of debt-to-GDP ratio forecasted in the no-shock case is (partially) slowed down. 
Again, the variability is slightly lower in the Janus scenario: 78,2% against 73,3%. 
As far as Germany is concerned (figure A.22) a permanent reduction in GDP growth, keeps its 
debt dynamics steadily around 50%. 
 
4.3 Fiscal shock 
The third shock considered is an expansive government policy, which decreases the Primary 
Balance. Homogeneously to the previous cases, we consider a permanent shock whose 
dimension is a standard deviation for each period t. 
The expectations after a negative fiscal shock are those of a deterioration of debt dynamics 
(equation 2). 
Table 4: Baseline vs. Janus Eurobond responses to fiscal shocks_ last observation 
 Baseline value Janus value Baseline CI Janus CI 
Italy 165,5% 87% 100,5% 84,3% 
France 62,6% 62% 78,7% 72,4% 
Germany 107,8% . 103,4% . 
 
Italian debt dynamics after a fiscal shock consistently differ in the two scenarios: in the 
baseline (figure A.23) debt ratio follows explosive paths of indefinite growth, while in the 
Janus Eurobond scenario (figure A.24), it shows a decreasing trend and seems stabilizing. 
As before, estimated variability is higher for the baseline scenario: 100,5% against 84,3%.. 
For the French case (figure A.25 and A.26) the debt dynamics react homogeneously to the 
fiscal shock; in both scenarios, debt-to-GDP decreases at a slower rate than estimated in the 
no-shock scenario, returning back to its values in the first quarters of years 2000. The 
estimated variability is slightly higher in the baseline scenario: 78,7% against 72,4%. 
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Lastly, in figure A.27 we see German reaction after the shock: the value of debt-to-GDP ratio 
starts growing at a consistent rate, even if the estimated variability is so large that we cannot 






In this dissertation we proposed a design for Eurobond aimed at increasing the stability of the 
European Monetary Union while containing the scope for moral hazard. 
The limit of this analysis lies in the construction of the counterfactual scenario, which stands 
on the assumption that the macroeconomic environment did not significantly deviate from 
historical after the introduction of the Eurobond, which is reasonable only for the years before 
2007. A possible future extension of this work may overcome this limit creating a synthetic 
counterfactual building a Eurobond version for all the macroeconomic and fiscal variables 
combining all the information at disposal. 
In our framework, the Janus Eurobond revealed its effectiveness immunizing the European 
Monetary Union from exogenous shocks. The positive effect is the most significant for 
peripheral countries as Italy, while for intermediate countries as France it is only slightly 
beneficial. For core countries, our model does not allow us to capture the true dynamics, 
because the effect is virtually null. Nonetheless, we can imagine an advantage due to the 
increased stability of the system. 
Beside the verified Pareto-improvement for the monetary union in the stabilization of the 
macroeconomic system, a proposal of bi-faced Eurobond may be politically implementable, 
because it does not imply significant redistributive effects between Member states. Other 
advantages include the creation of a neutral tool for monetary policy that may be used by the 
European institutions to pursue monetary policy and perform open market operations in a 
much smoother way.  
Furthermore the structure and features of the Janus Eurobond are highly flexible, as they are 
institutionally designed; therefore the pursuing of EMU long-term stabilization may be paired 
with other short-term objectives. 
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Figure A.4: Italy_baseline scenario 
 
 








Figure A.5b: Italy_Janus Eurobond_  Growth Adjusted 
 
 




Figure A.6: France_baseline scenario 
 
 















Figure A.7b: France_Janus Eurobond_  Growth Adjusted 
 
 




Figure A.9: Italy_ Interest Expenditure 
 
 
























Figure A.13: Italy _ monetary shock_ baseline 
 
 






































Figure A.18: Italy _ real shock_ baseline 
 
 





Figure A.20: France _ real shock_ baseline 
  
 

























Figure A.23: Italy _ fiscal shock_ baseline 
 
 





Figure A.25: France _ fiscal shock_ baseline 
  
 
Figure A.26: France _ fiscal shock_ Janus Eurobond  
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